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Recent changes in the balance of power among foreign policy decision makers 
and an increasingly assertive and independent news media are well documented (Holsi, 
2007; Foyle, 1999; Entman, 2004; Bennett, 1994; Sobel, 2001; Powlick and Katz, 1998; 
Zaller and Chiu, 2000). The balance of power became more reflective of the Cold War 
era after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US northeast. The news media 
retransmitted official government pronouncements, a shift in standard operating 
procedures common during national security crises (Bennett et al, 2007). The American 
news media were more deferential and supportive of government officials, aside from the 
traditional role as providers of essential information during crises. Under certain 
conditions, the US media cover executive branch generated foreign policy without 
sufficient analysis and skepticism. For example, the reaction of the American p ess to the 
Pearl Harbor event was supportive of the Roosevelt administration and supportive of 
military engagement against hostile countries. After 9/11, the Bush administrat on altered 
some basic US foreign policy strategy assumptions. Geographic isolation arguably 
offered no protection from terrorist acts, especially from suicide bombers with weapons 
of mass destruction. Containment of non-state actors was viewed as problematic and n
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 ineffective means of securing against a future domestic attack. A strategy of pre-emptive 
military action was seen as necessary to combat the emerging terroris  threat. 
Deferential coverage of executives is also partly dependent upon the perceived 
efficacy of proposed foreign policy measures, the level of anxiety present within the 
public, and the presence of divided government. The effects upon the press of public 
psychological reactions to terrorism are of particular interest. Will press coverage of 
presidents and their foreign policy agendas become more or less critical/deferential with 
the presence of heightened public anxiety regarding future terrorist actions? Specifically, 
did White House Press Corps journalists use a more/less adversarial questioning yle 
during presidential press briefings in the midst of national security crises like the period 
after 9/11? 
The US news media act as the primary means of information exchange between 
the mass public and foreign policy decision makers. Some scholars have focused on the 
ability of elite publics and government officials to lead mass opinion and to constrain the 
media from full analytical and evaluative coverage, especially during a foreign policy 
crisis (Zaller and Chiu, 2000; Mueller, 1971; Galbraith, 2008). Others have pointed to the 
mass public’s ability to alter some foreign policy decisions under certain conditions, 
finding that the public can constrain foreign policy decision-making (Foyle, 1999; Sobel, 
2001; Holsti, 2006). At the same time elites and decision-makers will attempt to lead 
public opinion to support policy preferences. Many studies over the past 35 years have 
attempted to model and simplify this complex interrelationship among government, 
elites, the media, and the mass public (Baum and Potter, 2008.) 
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These models explain aspects of linkages between foreign policy, the US news 
media, and US publics. The media indexing model has received particular attention.. 
Media indexing assumes that the news media will index stories to the range of official 
opinion on a given issue such that foreign policy coverage will reflect the views of 
prominent officials and source of governmental power.  
The model explains well facets of the foreign policy/media/public opinion link. 
Media indexing does not fully explain support within the US media for executive branch 
foreign policy preferences and actions during much of the post 9/11 period generally, and 
the period between September 20, 2001 and March 19, 2003 specifically. Indexing 
overlooks the effect of prevailing public mood on news media deference to the executive. 
Understanding more fully the interaction of foreign policy decision makers, the US news 
media, and the US public during foreign policy crises like the 2002 framing war that 
preceded actual war is important for three reasons. 
First, reality may be perceived as a construction of rhetoric (Kelley, 2007; 
Schultz, 1970).  Newsworthiness is partly dependent upon “prevailing political and 
social” ideologies at a given time, and upon what a particular society finds socially 
significant (Graber, 2006). The eventual meaning of mediated presentations will be 
influenced by these considerations also.  The US government routinely utilizes news 
organizations to inform and lead public action in crisis situations through direct and 
mediated presentations of information supplied by the government to the media (Graber, 
2006). The International Crisis Behavior website defines a foreign policy crisis by three 
criteria: “a threat to one or more basic values, along with an awareness of finite time for 
response to the value threat, and a heightened probability of involvement in military 
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hostilities (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000; Hewitt, 2003).” Bush administration rhetoric 
after the 9/11 crisis set the US on several foreign policy courses. One of the most 
controversial was to consider preemptive elimination of potential threats to national 
security. In a June, 2002 speech to cadets at West Point President Bush stated: 
“Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass 
destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist 
allies.” The conflation of the terrorist group al-Qaeda and Iraqi dictator Sddam Hussein 
implicit in this statement was understood by some to signal a larger shift in priorities 
within the executive branch. Shared political beliefs allowed for the imposition of a series 
of familiar and culturally consistent frames and metaphors used to magnify support for 
war (Edelman, 1988; Hart and Hassencahl, 2005; Entman, 2004). The dubious veracity of 
some of these assertions and frames did little to alter their persuasiveness (Kull et al, 
2004). 
Some US news media coverage of executive branch generated foreign policy after 
9/11 took a deferential tone. Whether due to rally effects felt within the US news media
or a business decision to keep information suppliers (government officials) and 
consumers (the pre-sold public) happy, the US news media largely supported Bush 
administration positions on post 9/11 foreign policy (Zaller and Chiu, 2000; Baker and 
O’Neal, 2001; Chapman and Reiter, 2004; Baum and Potter, 2008). The media indexing 
model doesn’t fully answer why the US news media failed to provide sufficient crtical 
analysis of Bush administration framing of the US/Iraq relationship in 2002-2003. 
Second, public opinion has no single influence on policy. Interactions between 
elite and mass opinion, events, and decision contexts result in a variable effect of opinion
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on foreign policy (Foyle, 1999). US citizens are largely uninformed on matters of foreign 
policy, and the demands of daily life preclude intellectual assessment of governmental 
policy problems for all but the most salient decisions (Almond, 1950; Lippman, 1965). 
For other less salient decisions, non-crisis foreign policy decisions for example, the 
public’s plastic mood may influence preferences (Almond, 1950; Lippman, 1965). Also, 
individual affective experiences are diverse within the US public and within individuals 
over time (Rahn, 2000).  Public anxiety measures that assess public mood related to the 
fear of future terrorism and presidential ability to mitigate terrorist action may explain 
why the media are often overly deferential to government sources during crisis periods. 
Third, democratic theories hold that government officials should be accountable 
to the public. But the public must rely on mediated sources for information, especially 
foreign policy information (Holsti, 2004). When the news media are constrained by 
standard practices, or a desire to deflect bias charges as was the case for much of the 
2001-2003 debate over war with Iraq, democratic accountability may be compromised 
(Baum and Potter, 2008; Graber, 2006).  Foreign policy coverage of the US news media 
will ordinarily reflect the diversity of opinion among prominent officials and institutional 
factions (Bennett, 1990). During the months after 9/11 few official voices criticized the 
foreign policy pronouncements and directives of the Bush administration. The muted 
response may have been due to rally effects, or may illustrate the tendency of lected 
officials to modify actions in the face of activated public opinion.  
The creation of foreign policy news is affected by more than ranking the impact 
and importance of relevant events as they occur. This thesis examines the adversari l 
nature of US press questioning of the executive during presidential press conferences and 
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whether increases in adversarial questioning during the Bush administration were related 
to public terrorism anxiety. Findings include consistent, moderately strong positive 
correlations between public anxiety regarding terrorist actions, and overtly hostile and 
negative questioning of Bush administration press conferences; and strong positive 
correlations between executive approval and question types indicating press deferenc  to 
the president.  
The second section provides background information regarding the 
interdependent relationship between public opinion and foreign policy in general. The 
third section discusses relevant literature: public mood in the context of foreign policy 
debates; the role media deference and standard operating behaviors play in foreign p licy 
debates; the psychological effects of terrorist actions upon public sentiments; and the role 
of the public in foreign policy decision making. A fourth section contains a theoretical 
explanation and several hypotheses intended to illustrate the causal relationships between 
independent and dependent variables. A methods section details the research design, unit 
of analysis, temporal context, and operationalized independent and dependent variables. 
The final section contains analysis of data, an assessment of theoretical expectations, and 
implications for future research.  
Background 
Influence of Public Opinion on US Foreign Policy 
The influence of public opinion upon foreign policy is complex. A variety of 
causal links between public opinion, events, the press, and foreign policy decision-
makers have been suggested by many authors (See Figure 1). The context of public
opinion influence on US foreign policy has three layers. The first is US history and 
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processes of cultural/political socialization.  Based upon representative democratic 
traditions and the American constitutional framework, American history provides the 
basis of public beliefs and values (Jentleson, 1992; Sobel, 2001; Holsti, 2004). The 
American political tradition and system of government require public interest and 
participation, as well as active information dissemination by the press.  
[Figure 1 About Here] 
Second, the political ideological and foreign policy beliefs of the public limit the actions 
of foreign policy makers (Jentleson, 1992; Sobel, 2001; Holsti, 2004). American values 
inform individual decision making and set the limits of acceptable foreign policy actions 
by government leaders. Decision makers find it advantageous to craft policy within an 
acceptable range so that segments of the public who would reject policies on the left or 
right ends of the continuum do not become activated allowing policy makers to act 
without constraint (Stimson, 1999). 
 Third, the fluctuating nature of public opinion means different foreign policy 
actors are presented with different sets of boundaries and differing constraints to action 
over time. Within the boundaries of American political ideology, fluctuations in public 
mood related to feelings of societal stability and political efficacy can constrain/free/alter 
the choices of decision makers. External events and/or the choices of decision makers 
may lead to individual or collective reassessment of societal stability (Huddy et al, 2005). 
In periods of economic distress, prolonged combat losses that were the result of military
action, or when trust in governmental leaders has waned, the ability of decision makers to 
dominate the policy process diminishes regardless of public interest in specific olic es 
(Foyle, 1999; Jentleson, 1992; Mueller, 1971; Holsti, 2006). 
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US Press Behavior, US Public Preferences, and Foreign Policy 
One of the most important connections among foreign policy, the US news media, 
and the US public, is the information exchange network facilitated by the mass media. A 
variety of observations and interactions have been noted over time. News media 
organizations were viewed as able to control public thinking in the 1940s; but likened to 
a conveyor belt with limited independent influence in the 1950s-1970s.  
Media effects are now believed to be of variable nature and intensity depending upon a 
variety of factors, though it is accepted that the US news media can influence publi  
opinion through agenda setting, priming, and framing abilities (Cohen, 1963; Zaller, 
1992; Brody, 1991; Page and Shapiro 1992).  
  The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 temporarily altered the political 
behavior of many individuals and groups. The news media, the Congress, the public, and 
individuals in the executive branch shared the tendency to rally-round-the-flag and to 
view opposition to the president’s foreign policy agenda as unpatriotic. During the 
months after 9/11, few official voices criticized the foreign policy pronouncements and 
directives of the Bush administration. This may reflect rally effects, or the muted 
response may be an example of the tendency of elected officials to modify actionsin he 
face of activated public opinion. For some, the deferential attitude may have lasted too 
long and may have occurred for less sound reasons than to rally-round-the-flag. The US
press has a tradition of initially supporting US military engagements abroad (DiMaggio, 
2008; Jentleson, 2007). The soft coverage of the Bush administration after 9/11 illustrates 
this tendency. The 9/11 attacks brought terrorism to the forefront of American political 
life. At the same time, terrorism against US interests was conflated wih the continued 
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existence of intransigent US adversaries in Asia. After 9/11, a sizable portion f the 
public agreed with polling questions that asked if the US should respond militarily 
against Iraq whether or not that government had carried out the attacks. Elites took to the 
airwaves advocating removal of many world dictators, especially Saddam Hussein. This 
November 25th, 2001 ABC news excerpt quotes former CIA director James Woolsey, an 
early proponent of attacking Iraq whether or not the state was connected to the 9/11 
attacks:  
We don't start with the international community and take a vote and work 
backward to our policies.  We find the people who have come after us, and 
Saddam has come after us on more than one occasion, and we cure the 
problem, and I think the time is right now, after we win Afghanistan, to 
begin to move against Iraq. 
 
Woolsey’s contention was undisputed by ABC’s moderator or others present for the 
panel discussion. During the broadcast, this unchallenged explicitly supportive statement 
of belief stood as the final statement on the potential connection between Iraq and 9/11 
terrorism, and the necessity of attacking Iraq. Many similar assertions went unchallenged 
by journalists in following months.  
Structural and Psychological Elements of the US Press and Presidential Deferenc  
Newsworthiness is partly dependent upon prominent political and social 
ideologies at a given time, and upon what a particular society finds significant (Graber, 
2006). Individual perceptions as to the meaning of mediated presentations are also 
influenced by these considerations. The US government routinely utilizes the news media 
to inform and lead public action in crisis situations through direct and mediated 
presentations of information supplied by the government to the American press (Graber, 
2006). The for-profit middleman status of the press must account for a portion of the 
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inaccurate portrayals within the range of criticism regarding the Bush administration’s 
foreign policy decisions after 9/11. Economic concerns constrain press activity. Cost-
benefit considerations, a lack of international relations expertise among US journalists, 
the high cost of creating substantive news reports from foreign countries, and producer-
consumer issues can limit effective foreign policy journalism by the US press (Graber, 
2006).  
Journalists are often too close to, and too dependent upon, sources of official 
government information, especially during crisis situations like 9/11 (Bennett, Lawrence, 
and Livingston, 2007; Graber, 2006). Structural elements of the US press system promote 
deference to the president. Communications professionals shape a great deal of the raw 
information journalists craft into news (Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston, 2007). 
Changes in government regulation of broadcasting led to the creation of niche markets 
for news, and a transition in content and coverage to include more deference to official 
government sources, more soft news, and infotainment stories (Bennett, Lawrence, and 
Livingston, 2007). Traumatic national events, especially in the foreign policy arena, 
strengthen deference to government officials. 
Press deference during traumatic events has psychological and structural 
components. During crisis periods the news media function as both communications 
support for official government crisis control agencies and objective reporters f reality 
(Graber, 2006). This structural limitation of the US communication system means th t 
broadcasters and journalists must, at times, suspend standard practices in order to convey 
government messages pertaining to public safety and emergency management. Crisis 
control in these periods takes precedence over objective and analytical coverge of 
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events. The news media must also react to the psychological effects of the rally-round-
the-flag phenomenon (Mueller, 1971; Zaller and Chiu, 2000).  
Journalists must contend with personal feelings of patriotism engendered by the 
temporarily unifying event and perform professionally under atypical circumstances that 
include suppressing information and conveying government messages directly (Graber, 
2006).  During the 9/11 period, media outlets whose coverage strayed too far from the 
range of current public opinion and officially sanctioned government opinion on the 
relevant issues were charged with biased coverage, “crusading for a cause,” or exhibiting 
a lack of patriotism (Graber, 2006).  
To avoid these entanglements, the US news media tend to report only that range 
of discussion present in official government circles (Graber, 2006; Bennett, Lawrence, 
and Livingston, 2007). These constraints result in a press system that restates executiv  
branch foreign policy prescriptions and restates whatever criticism is leveled from 
members of Congress, but conducts insufficient independent critical assessment (Bennett, 
Lawrence, and Livingston, 2007). When official sources do not sufficiently contest 
executive branch foreign policy prescriptions, the US news media will not independently 
drive critical news coverage (Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston, 2007; Schudson, 1992; 
Bannerman, 2004).  
Mini Culpas of the US Press after the Run-Up to Iraq 
Members of the US press faulted their own unprofessional behavior in the run-up 
to the Iraq war. The New York Times, The Washington Post, Slate magazine, and others 
published articles in 2004 that skirted and/or accepted minimal responsibility for failing
to forcefully analyze Bush administration claims that Iraq sought to produce nucl ar 
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weapons and possessed new weapons of mass destruction. The Times made no direct 
reference to Judith Miller, cheerleading for war, or over-reliance upon single dubious 
sources, but the article did find fault with the desire to ‘scoop’ competitors and be present 
for the BIG story. To get to the big story, the Times, the Post and dozens of other US 
press organizations routinely buried criticism of Bush administration assertions and 
glossed over contention regarding the veracity of administration claims on the presence 
of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the true status of the Iraqi nuclear progr m. A 
series of common political beliefs also aided this tendency of the press to under-criticize 
officials on Iraq intelligence. 
Shared political beliefs allowed for the imposition of a series of familiar and 
culturally consistent frames and metaphors used to magnify support for war (Edelman, 
1971; Hart and Hassencahl, 2005; Entman, 2004). The falsity of some of these assertions 
and frames did not alter their persuasiveness (Kull et al, 2004). The Bush administration 
telegraphed intent to democratize and remove from power the most oppressive regimes: 
Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Syria. The Bush administration continued to maintain 
relationships with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, undemocratic and repressive countries who 
had supplied the al-Qaeda group with men to carry out the 9/11 attacks. One 
psychological effect of 9/11 was an increase in black-and-white thinking among 
individuals at all levels of society. Black-and-white thinking is a form of cognitive 
simplification common during high stress periods (Glad, 1983). Reducing complex 
situations and actors to dichotomous classifications simplifies uncertain situations. One 
result of this cognitive style is a tendency to deprecate out-groups and idealize the 
familiar (Glad, 1983). This kind of perceptual rigidity is common in crisis and could be 
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seen in statements made by US officials after 9/11. Members of the mass public made 
statements indicating a similar rigidity of perception on the Iraq issue. The US news 
media were affected by rally effects along with the mass public (Zaller and Chiu, 2000). 
Press coverage increased informational disadvantages of the public relative to elit  
decision makers (Baum and Potter, 2008). Many assertions were repeated with little 
secondary verification. When contention between official and/or elite sources was found, 
criticisms were often buried in the back sections of newspapers or at the end of tlevised 
presentations. The excessive deference paid to official sources after 9/11 altered n 
important balance of power within American society. 
The American political system separates government authority and power by 
constitutional design. The constitutional separation of power among legislative, 
executive, and judicial functions was perceived to be an important preventative measure 
to check the potential for accumulation of power and influence among factions or 
individuals within government. The press is an important equalizing component within 
the American political system. Three essential functions of the US press are to provide a 
forum to publicly discuss public issues, to report news, and to identify public problems. 
Citizens must have access to objective information regarding the actions and intentions of 
governmental decision makers in order to make rational voting decisions. Lacking the 
unbiased information transmitted by an objective press, the US public did not receive 
comprehensive analysis of administration claims on Iraq in much 2002 coverage. The 
necessary balance of power between official foreign policy information suppliers and the 
press did not exist after the 9/11 crisis and resultant psychological effects.  
 14
The American press feared public perceptions of biased coverage during the 
unprecedented national tragedy. The rally effects created an environment supportive of 
unilateral internationalist policies and amounted, in some cases, to blind support of any 
military target deemed by the president to have been a part of the terroris actions. Even 
the opposition party was largely supportive of taking some decisive military action. 
Crises like 9/11 reveal a flaw in the media indexing model. Media indexing is standard 
operating procedure for the American press. The press will cover the range of official 
disagreement on a given foreign policy issue, thus reflecting the diversity of opinion of 
“prominent officials and institutional power blocs (Bennett, 1990).” As few prominent 
officials were inclined to explicitly criticize the Bush administration foreign policy 
agenda, explicit criticisms were often lacking in news media foreign policy coverage 
during 2001-2002. Without the objective information and critical analysis needed to 








REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
US Public Opinion and Foreign Policy 
The effect of public opinion on policy has been called “awesome (Ericson, 
Wright, and McIver, 1993; Burstein, 2003, 35).” Others see public opinion as much less 
influential upon policy (Domhoff, 1998). Public opinion has the potential to constrain 
foreign policy choices (Markel, 1949). One long standing assertion is that foreign policy 
must have the “support of public opinion” to succeed (Markel, 1949). Absent that 
support, public opinion may be shaped with guidance and persuasion from 
knowledgeable elites (Holsti, 2007). Attempts to shape mass attitudes are justifi d and 
explained by two conflicting truths. Some measure of public support for foreign policy is 
necessary, but individual Americans are likely to be uninformed on specific and general 
points of foreign policy (Page and Shapiro, 1992).  
In American politics, the conventional post-WWII wisdom has held that opinions 
of the mass public are too unstable, unstructured, and formed in an overly emotional 
manner to prudently inform foreign policy decisions (Almond,1950; Markel, 1949; 
Lippman,1922). Vietnam-era political research altered the conventional wisdom by 
suggesting that opinions of the mass public, while admittedly not well informed, are more 
stable and rational than previously believed (Page and Shapiro, 1992). 
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It has been argued that the public’s relatively stable ideological orientations combined 
with elite education and guidance provide a rational and more or less coherent base from 
which to assess foreign policy options (Sobel, 2001).  
 Traditional theories regarding the connection between public opinion and policy 
were crafted decades ago (Almond, 1950; Rosenau, 1961; Page and Shapiro, 1983; 
Markel, 1949; Lippman, 1922). Most argued public opinion sets a normative range of 
acceptable foreign policy actions but individual members of the public were not well 
informed on relevant issues (Almond, 1950; Rosenau, 1961; Page and Shapiro, 1983; 
Lippman, 1965). Almond (1950), Markel (1949), and Lippman (1965) found the mass 
public to be uninformed on matters of foreign policy. The demands of daily life tended to 
preclude intellectual assessment of governmental policy problems in all but the most 
salient situations (Almond, 1950). For other less salient decisions such as those involving 
non-crisis foreign policy decisions, the public are more likely to rely on “plastic moods” 
and stereotyping instead of more rational means of assessment (Almond, 1950; Lippman, 
1965).   
Public Mood 
Almond (1950) identified several public moods, which were a series of continua 
between the dispositions of withdrawal-intervention, optimism-pessimism, tolerance-
intolerance, idealism-cynicism, and superiority-inferiority. When called upon to consider 
foreign policy, the relatively uninformed and unengaged public craft foreign policy 
preferences based on some combination of these moods. For example, before Pearl 
Harbor in 1941, Almond found the prevailing American public mood to have been one of 
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combined withdrawal tendencies: “cynicism about power politics,” intolerance of foreign 
cultures, and pessimism about the success of internationalist action (Almond, 1950).  
 Pearl Harbor effectively focused the mood of the public toward a more 
interventionist, idealistic, and optimistic stance. This state endured for a time until 
degrading relations between WWII allies influenced the public toward a less to rant and 
optimistic position regarding foreign affairs. American attention (activation) o foreign 
policy appears to be “threat bound” and too dependent upon the individual value 
orientations of Americans (Almond, 1950).  The public should, therefore, be educated to 
make US policies and goals clearly understood (Markel, 1949). Whether shaped by elites 
or self-formed, public opinion functions as directive (defining the limits of acceptable 
foreign policy), and as instrument (unity of public opinion results in political capital for 
decision makers) (Markel, 1949).  
Public Knowledge of Foreign Policy 
 Rosenau (1961) Lippmann (1965) and Markel (1949) advocated public education 
on foreign policy matters. Lippmann asserted that individual reliance upon imperfect 
cognitive aids such as stereotyped assumptions that simplify decisions and allow general 
belief systems to guide individual action should be augmented by experts in political 
theory who should educate the public and formulate new means of perceiving foreign 
policy, and the place of the US in the world (Lippmann, 1965). Rosenau (1961) proposed 
that the mass public and opinion makers interacted (two-step flow) through a variety of 
primary and secondary channels of communication (speeches, media, political partes,
informal information networks, etc.) and noted that, at various points, the “decision 
making, opinion-submitting, and opinion-making processes overlap.” Rosenau’s model 
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and theory could not identify the form and frequency of these overlaps, and was not 
designed to identify causal factors, but to describe the flows of information to/from mass 
public to opinion makers.   
 Markel (1949) also found the public to be uninformed on matters of foreign 
policy, but believed that foreign policy decisions must have the “full support of public 
opinion” to succeed. In Markel’s view, the three primary shapers of public opinion are 
the government, the press, and citizen groups with the government holding the most 
important role as educator of the other two groups who transmit the government’s 
message to the mass public. The federal government conveys foreign policy ideas 
through speeches and other public statements meant to influence and educate the public 
delivered by the president, congressmen, the military, and the Department of State 
(Markel, 1949). 
The resultant conventional wisdom held that public opinion was too volatile to 
provide stable and effective policies, and lacked “coherence or structure,” and therefore 
should have little “impact on foreign policy (Holsti, 1992; Lippmann, 1965; Almond, 
1950).”  As a result of these difficulties, some have argued that it may be too much 
trouble to seek public approval for all foreign policy actions. Foreign policy decision 
makers may avoid activating public interest because public opinion is unpredictable on 
specific foreign policy issues and because “public scrutiny may raise the political costs” 





Foreign Policy Attitudes of the American Public   
 Maggiotto and Wittkopf (1981) stress that traditional and non-traditional issues 
will likely affect public opinion in variable and counterintuitive ways as mass and elite 
publics often interpret non-traditional foreign policy decision-making contexts 
differently. The main difference between elites/decision makers and mass publics is 
centered on levels of comfort with internationalist policies including both cooperative 
and military variants (Sobel, 2001; Holsti, 2006; Foyle, 1999). According to Chittick, 
Billingsly, and Travis (1990), Maggiotto and Wittkopf (1981), and Holsti (2006), the 
belief schemas that shape American public opinion regarding foreign policy allow 
assessment of potential actions on at least three levels: identity (support for unilateralism 
or multilateralism), security (support for militarism or non-militarism), and prosperity 
(internationalism or isolationism).  
 The attitude of the American mass public can more often be described as 
supporting a more “restrained and selective” semi-isolationist role in international affairs, 
while elites tend to support an internationalist role in foreign policy generally (Maggiotto 
and Wittkopf, 1981). It may also be the case that mass public attitudes are more variabl  
over time. Chittick, Billingsly, and Travis (1990) found noteworthy changes in mass 
public attitudes over a 12-year period from 1974-1986, while little change was recorded 
in the attitudes of elites for the same period. Jentleson (1992) noted similar changes in 
attitudes across a range of crisis-based situations in the 1980s and 1990s in which some 
situations received public support and some did not. The variation in public approval was 
explained as the centrist tendencies of a mass public that would support US military
action to restrain aggressor states seeking to alter power relations outsideits borders; but 
 20
who would not support military action that sought to impose “internal political change” 
upon states (Jentleson, 1992). 
 Researchers have described the constraining effects of public opinion upon 
foreign policy (Holsti, 2006; Foyle, 1999). Individuals within the mass public are 
generally more centrist and non-internationalist than elites (Holsti, 2006). One result is 
that foreign policy decision makers will at times seek to keep the public uninterested in 
foreign policy issues and/or to educate and persuade the public if the decision context 
permits (Holsti, 2006; Markel, 1949). The constitutional structure of US government, the 
nature of American public opinion, and the impact on public opinion of the decision 
context condition the effect of public opinion on decision makers. In addition, political 
knowledge among the American public is notoriously low (Graber, 2006; Holsti, 2006). 
As a result, the nature of public opinion makes it a bad guide for decision makers. 
Foreign policy decision makers often seek to lead the public or to educate them on 
foreign policy issues so that future public opinion will support official policies.  Crisis 
periods make this easier as the public often “rally around the flag” to support decision 
makers temporarily. In spite of these problems, many have found that the public will 
affect policy outcomes in some circumstances (Page and Shapiro, 1983; Burstein, 2003; 
Shapiro and Page, 1988; Jentleson, 1992; Holsti, 2006; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson, 
1995). 
Public Opinion Constrains Decision Makers 
Many have noted the constraining effects of public opinion on government policy 
(Holsti, 2006; Foyle, 1999; Mueller, 1970; Canes-Wrone and Shotts, 2004). If the level of 
public support determines a president's ability to influence other decision makers and the
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political environment, then understanding the determinants of public support is of crucial
importance (Neustadt, 1980). Public approval of presidents has been shown to be 
partially cyclic in nature (Mueller, 1970). Campaigns, elections, and inaugurations have 
traditionally marked the high popular approval mark in any administration of the last 50 
years (Brace and Hinckley, 1992). American voters tend to provide favorable or 
unfavorable appraisals of presidents based partly on their perceptions of those presidents 
(Neustadt, 1980; Mueller, 1970).  These approval assessments motivate, as well as 
constrain presidential action (Mueller, 1970; Brace and Hinckley, 1992). The personal 
beliefs and values of presidents regarding public opinion and image management ability, 
the salience of issues for voters, as well as the impact of events are important 
determinants of public approval (Mueller, 1970; Canes-Wrone Shotts, 2004). 
Popular presidential approval assessments are reached through some combination 
of character and job performance evaluations (Rahn, 1990). These assessments have been 
likened to political currency that the president may use to influence the public and others 
within government (Neustadt, 1980; Edwards, 1989). Circumstances (economic 
conditions, international events, and national crises), an administration’s skill at 
compromise, negotiation, and image management, as well as the simple passage of time 
are important determinants (Brace and Hinckley,1991; Mueller 1970; Gronke and 
Newman, 2003). Mueller identified four independent variables presumed to act upon the 
dependent variable presidential approval: 1. The “coalition of minorities” variable 
assumed that presidents would lose public support over time as presidential decisions 
alienated former allies; 2. The “rally round the flag” variable assumes that certain 
“specific, dramatic, and sharply focused” international crises (such as the outset of some 
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military conflicts or terrorist attacks like 9/11) directly involving the Pr sident and the 
U.S. will increase presidential approval ratings temporarily; 3. The “economic slump” 
variable assumes a negative correlation between the national unemployment rate a d 
presidential approval ratings; and 4. The “war” variable assumes a fairly strong negative 
correlation between presidential popularity and US involvement in prolonged military 
engagements like Vietnam, Korea, or the current Iraq war (Mueller, 1970, 2005). Mueller 
found that these variables “significantly affected presidential approval,” noting that they 
explained nearly 86% of variation in presidential popularity across presidents when 
applied to a multiple regression model (Mueller, 1970; Gronke and Newman, 2003). 
Subsequent studies have investigated the effects of the media and the cognitive 
limitations of voters, along with changes to analytic methods and modeling to account for 
“the special characteristics of each administration (Mueller, 1973).”  
Public Political Knowledge and Processing Ability is Varied 
Attention to politics and individual information acquisition and processing 
capacities varies widely (Neustadt, 1980; Rubin, 1981; Ostrom and Simon, 1988; Canes-
Wrone and Shotts, 2004). Individuals use various cognitive processes to derive political 
attitudes and choices. Several individual cognitive factors influence opinion on foreign 
policy issues. Political sophistication, the degree of political motivation, and the 
individual’s level of political knowledge will influence the cognitive processes utilized to 
reach conclusions. Lodge et al (1995) advocate an on-line model of evaluation over 
memory-based models. Their findings suggest that messages of political actors are 
integrated into an “affective on-line tally” that informs the voter’s opinion in a more 
cognitively efficient manner than would continuously weighing the many issue stances 
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and characteristics of candidates (Lodge et al, 1995). In addition, citizens with conflicted 
feelings towards a president or foreign policy may arrive at their opinion thrug  focus 
on a variety “of considerations used to construct an opinion at a given time (Lavine, 
2001).” Further, the opinions of ambivalent persons are less stable than those whose 
affective valences are more unified. The problem of ambivalence caused by 
simultaneously holding conflicting information may be reconciled through the simplest of 
cognitive heuristics: socio-demographic similarity and/or party identifica on (Lavine, 
2001). Heuristic devices may be defined as consciously or unconsciously applied 
“problem solving strategies which serve to keep the information processing demands of 
tasks within bounds (Lau and Redlawsk, 2003).” Heuristic devices reflect an individual’s 
attempt to simplify some complex set of choices by using internally derive cognitive 
short-cuts. 
The public draw from the same pool of mediated information to make a choice, 
but the processes by which decisions are made differ based on varying individual 
political knowledge, sophistication, strength of ideological orientation, and level of 
interest (Ansolabahere and Iyengar, 1997). Individual processing quality varies b sed on 
available information, level of interest, and education level (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson, 
2003). Individuals may assess the relative weight of competing issue frames or th y may 
simply use some heuristic device: personal likeability, gender, race, party id, or respect 
for tactics predicated upon an inference of competent and decisive behavior (Mille and 
Krosnick, 2000). Many individuals may expend very little energy or effort in arrving at 
some opinion preferring instead to use some cognitive short cut, or heuristic device.  
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It is widely accepted that people make political and foreign policy assessment 
within the constraints of our biological composition and political environment: we are 
cognitive misers with finite data processing abilities. Our various belief systems tend to 
affect our judgments, and the cognitive processes by which these judgments are made are 
themselves subject to the effects of various systematic biases (Conover and F ldman, 
1984; Converse, 1964; Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh, 1989). It is also the case that 
individuals are constrained from fully rational political assessments given that voters 
have a limited amount of time and energy available to research policy positions and 
presidential actions while responding to the many other demands of daily life. Individual 
use of heuristics, while capable of producing less than optimal results, may function 
adequately within institutional constraints (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001; Jentleson, 1992). 
The efficacy of heuristic short cuts seems to be facilitated by institutional 
constraints on choice. Options are systematically limited through social and political 
institutions that simplify choices and issue alternatives. Essentially, “we do not have our 
choice of choices; we have to choose from the alternatives on offer (Sniderman, 2000).” 
This abbreviation of public choice from a “conspicuously complicated decision-theoretic 
task” to a simplified either/or decision between “fixed ideological elements” 
accommodates the “approximate rationality” of heuristic short cuts (Sniderman, 2000). 
Heuristic devices in conjunction with other institutional constraints allow individuals to 
make political assessments with imperfect information and also allow presidents and 
subordinates to influence the public through argument and image manipulation 
(Waterman et al, 1999). 
 25
The use of heuristic short cuts in this manner has been widely discussed and 
accepted as a reality of individual political behavior. Taking cues from elite political 
actors is one such heuristic device. Individuals may simply assess the likeability of the 
messenger (the actor delivering the information) or may perform a more complicated 
assessment of the veracity of the message itself, in addition to that of the mess ng r 
(Kuklinski and Hurley, 1994). This process works differently for individuals of varying 
political sophistication and knowledge, logical capacity, and motivation, ranging from a 
simple affective assessment of the individual delivering some political messag  to a 
“detailed processing of message content” itself (Kuklinski and Hurley, 1994). Optimal 
use of this device is further dependent upon: the honesty of the argument presented by the 
political elite, unity of elite’s political messages on a given issue, and correctness of 
elite’s political assessment of issues. Problems arise when elites use less than fully 
truthful arguments and issue frames, as well as opponent communication suppression 
strategies to persuade the public to adopt elite positions as their own (Mondak, Mutz, and 
Huckfeldt, 1996; McGraw  and Hubbard, 2007; Cobb and Kuklinski, 1997).  
An example of one such suppression strategy is the elite unity model in which a 
unified elite “uphold a clear picture of what should be done” that is adopted by the larger 
public primarily because other perceptions and policy prescriptions are obscured (Paul 
and Brown, 2001). If a unified elite frame issues in a one-sided manner, the public “tend 
to see the issue similarly (Paul and Brown, 2001).”  As a consequence, mass perceptions 
of elite opinion alone may be an unreliable heuristic device in many cases. The effects of 
elite manipulation may be undone by an individual’s crosscutting deliberations and 
interactions through intermediate collectives (Druckman and Nelson, 2003; Mondak, 
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Mutz, and Huckfeldt, 1996). The divergent views expressed in these environments may 
help to mitigate the external framing effects of elites so that voters may use internally 
derived heuristic devices in a more accurate fashion (Druckman and Nelson, 2003; 
Mondak, Mutz, and Huckfeldt, 1996, 2000). Mondak et al. (2000) assert that the 
perceptions gained by individuals through interaction with various “intermediate 
collectives,” within society can act to inform the process of candidate and issue 
evaluation by voters and minimize the effectiveness of elite issue frames. 
For some, the formation of political views is facilitated through the use of 
heuristic devices (source credibility, candidate traits, likeability) that allow individuals to 
approximate rational choice by taking advantage of the wealth of elite cues to b  found in 
media content. Taking political cues from elite political actors is one such heristic 
device wherein the voter may simply assess the credibility of the messeng r, or may 
perform a more complicated assessment of the veracity of the message itself in addition 
to the congruity of that message with the messenger (Kuklinski and Hurley, 1994; 
Iyengar and Valentino, 1994).  
Optimal use of heuristic devices is dependent upon the honesty of the argument 
presented by elites; the relative salience of political messages on a given issue; and the 
correctness of the individual’s issue assessment (Kuklinski and Hurley, 1994). Some of 
the persuasive function of the media upon popular opinion may be explained by this 
reproduction of strategic frames, sometimes resulting in insubstantial and factually 
questionable issue coverage (Barker and Knight, 2000). Presidents attempt to build 
political capital by influencing the public who provide the approval ratings (Neustadt, 
1980; Edwards, 1990).  
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 Media Agenda Setting and Individual Perception of Issues 
Political scientist Joseph Klapper saw the media’s persuasive effects as limited to 
reinforcement of ideas already held by the public, acting less often as a true “ gent of 
change (Klapper, 1960).” More recently, Zaller has described media persuasion effects as 
very strong, but of contradictory and “offsetting effects,” while Kinder described the 
ability of the media to influence the public through selective framing and organization of 
facts which provide “decisive cues” that are able to persuade individuals effectively 
(Zaller, 1992; Kinder, 2003). Framing allows the media to simplify and organize an 
immense volume of information through selective emphasis and presentation of 
information and/or perspectives (Kinder, 2003). The ability of the media to “define the 
essential problems underlying some political issue” and outline some aspect of it “in such 
a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation, and/or treatment evaluation” implies indirect persuasion of the public 
(Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson, 1997). Other research has suggested that the media has 
some ability to persuade the public through agenda setting. Priming is another facet of 
indirect media persuasion. Priming occurs when opinions and/or behavior change due to 
an “alteration of the relative weight given to various considerations making up the 
ultimate decision (Mendelsohn, 1996).” 
  The media has significant agenda setting ability as well as the ability to persuade 
the mass public indirectly. Lasswell described three functions of the media: “surveillance 
of the world” to describe global events; interpretation of those events; and “socialization 
of individuals into their cultural settings (Graber, 2006).” In recent years, a fourth has 
been added: the “deliberate manipulation of politics” by media organizations (Graber, 
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2006). Depending on the type of medium (print or televised) and the perceived level of 
threat surrounding an issue, the media may oversimplify, over-dramatize, or 
sensationalize their coverage. Boorstin (1964) noted that image had become more 
important than substance, and that the public had developed unreasonable expectations 
for the presidency. In spite of the image-over-substance argument, Beck (2002) claimed 
that mediated coverage of political events has little effect on most Americans, except for 
a small percentage who perceive a hostile media bias and tend to consequently solidify 
their pre-existing notions. Finkel (1993) agrees with this assessment: “The media 
probably play a crucial role in reinforcing pre-existing dispositions…and may play a 
crucial role in influencing voters” with incongruent dispositions, ideological orientations, 
and political preferences. 
The claim that mass communications exert a “cumulative effect on cognition,” s 
bolstered by very strong correlations between the “media’s ranking of issues” and the 
voter’s ranking of the same issues (Weaver, Graber, McCombs, and Eyal, 1981). As the 
media “confer status on public issues, persons, organizations, and social movements,” 
these have a greater likelihood of salience among the public (Weaver, Graber, McCombs, 
and Eyal, 1981). This is especially true if mediated presentations of information prove to 
be resonant and congruent with “preexisting beliefs about a political actor’s strengths or 
weaknesses (Iyengar and Valentino, 1994; Kinder, 2003).” Through framing, the media 
focus attention, airtime, and resources upon some issues at the expense of others, often 




Media Framing and Individual Perception of Issues 
Framing effects distinguish between framing and persuasion via belief change: 
traditional persuasion involves a source that presents a message about an attitude object 
to an audience (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson, 1997). If the message is understood by the 
audience and credible to the audience, if new message is discrepant from prior attitudes 
of audience, then the attitude should change in the direction implied by the new message. 
The goal is to change audience beliefs about an attitude object. Framing does not 
introduce new information separate from the audiences existing belief or knowledge 
structure. 
Frames operate by activating information already in audience memory. Framing 
increases the subjective weight (the perceived relevance of some idea, information, or 
attitude) of some information (people may support or oppose nuclear power, though both 
groups see potential benefits, due to difference in subjective weight of risk assesments, 
or environmental impact related to nuclear power) frames tell people how to weight 
carious issues. Crosscutting deliberations that result from interaction with “intermediate 
collectives,” within society can inform individuals and minimize the effectiveness of 
issue frames (Mondak, Mutz, and Huckfeldt, 2000; Druckman and Nelson, 2003).  
Framing provides a method by which the media, and consequently the public, can 
simplify and organize an immense volume of information through selective emphasis 
regarding the type of information presented and perspectives conveyed (Kinder, 2003). 
The ability of the media to “define the essential problems underlying some political 
issue” and outline some aspect of it “in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
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definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment evaluation” implies 
indirect persuasion of the public (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson, 1997). 
Persuasive effects are the result of media limits to the range of potential 
information an individual will consider in a given period of time. Essentially, “the news” 
will depict an incomplete snapshot of daily events, including and excluding events and 
perspectives according to market forces, narrative and technical constraints, as well as the 
personal evaluations of production and editorial staffs. When covering events in news 
broadcasts or newspapers, the media “confer status” on some public issues and events, 
while simultaneously excluding other issues through a lack of coverage (Kinder, 2003). 
As such, the media may not tell us what to think, but certainly tell us what to think about 
(Cohen, 1963; McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Scheufele, 2000). 
The news media reinforce individual standing beliefs and perceptions. Mediated 
presentations alter the subjective weight receivers of information give to aspects of 
issues. Frames operate by activating information already in audience memory. Framing 
increases the subjective weight (the perceived relevance of some idea, information, or 
attitude) of some information (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson, 1997). Primed by the media 
and the rest of their environment, individuals form opinions, processing their options 
according to conditional criteria (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson, 1997). Mediated accounts 
selectively focus on some aspects of issues over others effectively persuading individuals 
that their preexisting beliefs on some issue are relevant to an informed decision. News 
media priming occurs when “coverage of an issue makes some information particularly 
available in people’s memories,” information which “comes to mind automatically when 
people search” for evaluative information (Miller and Krosnick, 2000).  
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Indexing and Creation of the News 
The theory of media indexing assumes that the range of press coverage on a given 
foreign policy issue will reflect the diversity of opinion of “prominent officials nd 
institutional power blocs (Bennett, 1990).” Media coverage often mirrors the range of 
elite opinion as indexing theories suggest. Crisis periods do activate temporary rally-
round-the-flag effects that elicit deference to the executive branch from journalists, elites, 
and mass public alike (Mueller, 1971).  The Iraq war case represents this phenomenon 
but may be less reflective of media foreign policy coverage generally. The 2001 terrorist 
attacks on US civilian targets and the initial US military success in Afghanistan 
facilitated a profound and prolonged deferential elite and news media response, despit 
noteworthy levels of criticism from both groups (Mueller, 1970; Gronke and Newman, 
2003; Baum and Groeling, 2003; Entman and Page, 1990). Partisan differences related to 
varying deference to executive branch policies elicited from rally effects, and a media 
propensity to cover critical assertions of presidents’ likely affected decisions regarding 
inclusion/exclusion of media content as well (Baum and Groeling, 2003; Zaller and Chiu, 
2000). It may also be the case that different forms of indexing exist and work in 
combination.  
Althaus et al (1996) identified three types of media indexing: source indexing, 
power indexing, and political indexing. The first of these, source indexing, the idea that 
media coverage mirrors the range of legitimate elite opinion, was examined in this paper. 
Power indexing holds that journalists are more likely to publish voices of those in power: 
executive branch officials who are able to implement US foreign policy, and foreign 
governments whose opinions may constrain US foreign policy. Political indexing refers
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to the tendency of journalists to publish the story that “political authorities want to have 
reported (Baum and Groeling, 2003).” Increased independence of journalists in the post-
cold war period, and the decreased effectiveness of the Communism frame may lessen 
the tendency of journalist to employ political indexing. The 2001 attacks on US civilian 
targets may have reactivated the habitual deference of the media elicited by the 
Communist frame (Entman, 2004). Various types of indexing may be used in different 
combinations during different types of foreign policy events. In spite of some divergent 
findings, this research tends to echo conclusions that the media do index coverage of 
foreign policy events to the range of elite views. Media outlets provide coverage of 
foreign policy events conditioned by issue salience, competition with other news sources, 







Theory and Hypotheses 
Americans experienced a variety of emotional responses to the 9/11 attacks. Many 
were profoundly and immediately affected by the event, while others were not. Individual 
perceptions of threat to national stability and anxiety over the possibility of future 
terrorist attacks were two common emotional responses to the event. When coupled with 
perceptions of mortal terror, these responses primed different reactions among the public 
and American press. For those whose primary reaction was one of perceived threat, 
mortality salience increased nationalism and deferential attitudes towards the president 
(Huddy et al, 2005; Willer, 2004). Individual perceptions of anxiety primed isolationist 
and accommodative preferences in response to terrorism; these individuals in the press 
and general public would have been less supportive of Bush foreign policy during this 




Social identity theory and research into the psychological effects of terrrism help 
to explain the effects of these emotional responses upon press deference to the president. 
Social identity theory provides explanation for some discrimination among groups within
society (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner 1971; Willer, 2004).  
[Figure 2 About Here] 
The theory holds that individuals will categorize others and themselves in terms of 
opposites, forming many in-group/out-group pairs across a range of social and political 
contexts. Many group memberships lead to many perceptions of social identity within 
individuals. We are all simultaneously family members, citizens, members of some 
profession, etc. Context and the perceived relevance of out-groups increase in-group 
favoritism. The 9/11 attacks and the accompanying feelings of mortal terror provided a 
context which magnified the salience of national identity among Americans n 2001 
(Greenberg, Solomon, and Pyszczynski, 1997; Willer, 2004; Huddy et al, 2005). Political 
psychology literature asserts that perceived threat and anxiety in the wake of terrorist 
attacks are related, but distinct reactions to external threats and feelings of mortal terror 
(Jervis, 1976; Huddy et al, 2005; Jentleson, 1992; Herman, Tetlock, and Visser, 1999). 
The situational details of unique events as filtered through individual social identity a d 
dispositional frameworks drive the policy preferences of individuals (Herman, Tetlock, 
and Visser, 1999). Terrorist actions designed to prompt governments to make “political 
concessions” are often effective because they manipulate perceptions of anxiety mong 
members of the public (Huddy et al, 2005; Long, 1990). 
When affective reactions are centered on perceptions of threat, individuals are 
more likely to support some aggressive foreign policy action, as threat perceptions are 
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more likely to elicit animosity towards enemies and a desire to retaliat  (Loersch, 2001; 
Jentleson, 1992; Herman, Tetlock, and Visser, 1999). Perceived threats of terrorism or 
threats from out-groups in general can facilitate aggressive authoritarian policy responses 
and out-group mistrust (Sales, 1973; Doty, Peterson, and Winter, 1991; Staub and Bar-
Tal, 2003). Individual perceptions of threat are a “powerful determinant” of inter-group 
intolerance and aggression (Duckitt, 2003). Real or perceived threats from out-groups to 
resources, power, well-being, values, and group identity can result in animosity and 
hostility (Duckitt, 2003: Brown, 1995; Brown et al, 2001; Huddy and Sears, 1995; 
Reynolds and Turner, 2001). Acts of terrorism can easily be viewed as threats to in-group 
security, values, resources, and power. 
When anxiety is the pervasive reaction to terrorism, a different set of dispositions 
tend to prompt risk-avoidance behavior (Huddy et al, 2005). Perceptions of anxiety have 
different antecedents and act on human cognition differently than perceptions of threat. 
The effects of the anxiety response include impaired cognitive function due largely to 
preoccupation with threatening stimuli and a preference for reducing future anxiety by 
supporting foreign policy options perceived to impose the lowest degree of personal risk 
(Huddy et al, 2005; MacLeoud, Williams, and Bekerian, 1991). Anxiety increases 
feelings associated with risk aversion and prompts an affective state consistent with less 
support of military action and other aggressive internationalist foreign policy goals
(Huddy et al, 2005). Individual perceptions of anxiety are more often accompanied by 
isolationist and accommodative preferences, while individual perceptions of threat tend 
towards assertive internationalist policies (Holsti, 2004; Herman, Tetlock, and Visser, 
1999).  
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This thesis combines research previously described to form a novel approach to 
answering the question of press adversarialness and builds upon existing research in three 
important ways, all of which essentially amount to a greater focus upon the effects o  
public opinion. Determining the relationship between dependent variables and executive 
job approval and incorporating this relationship more directly into assessments of 
press/president relations integrates more fully a great deal of research that highlights the 
importance of public opinion, events, and time (Mueller, 1970; Stimson, 1976; Brace and 
Hinckley, 1992; Baum and Potter, 2008). This approach augments existing theory by 
incorporating assessments of public opinion into the press indexing theory.  
This thesis builds upon the theory of press indexing, or the idea that the range of 
press coverage on an issue will index the degree of disagreement present among official 
sources of power, and less official voices will receive less coverage. Press ind xing does 
explain well the relationship between press and president in normal times that are free 
from large-scale crises. These crises can act to activate and galvanize public opinion into 
some sort of consensus or near consensus that can then affect the manner in which press 
indexing of sources of power will occur. Explicitly stated, this research adds to current 
knowledge and understanding of press indexing by providing a better accounting of the 
effect of public opinion upon the indexing process undertaken by journalists and others in 
the press. The literature reviewed suggests a series of hypotheses. 
Hypotheses 
H 1: Adversarial questioning of the president will increase throughout the term of office 
in accordance with theories linking the decay of presidential approval to the passage of 
time. 
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H 2: Press deference will decrease/increase as presidential job approval ratings fall/rise. 
H 3: Press deference to the president will decrease/rise as public terrorism anxiety 
increases/falls. 
Research Design 
To examine these hypotheses, this thesis analyzes White House Press Corps 
questioning of the president during presidential press conferences to determine wheth r 
increases in adversarial questioning during the Bush administration occurred, and if these 
increases were related to the length of time spent in office, public terrorism anxiety, and 
executive job approval changes. Dependent variables were drawn from a sample of 16 
Bush administration press conferences from 2001-2008. Two news conferences were 
chosen per year for each year of the Bush presidency. The presidential press conference 
is the unit of analysis. Press conferences were chosen from the spring and autumn of each 
year to mitigate the effects on “president-press relations” of mid-term elections, of the 
cyclical nature of presidential approval, as well as unique events that occur during 
administrations (the effects of 9/11, a stalled economy, or domestic terrorism) (Clayman 
and Heritage, 2002; Mueller, 1970; Brody, 1991). The design of press questions were 
analyzed and coded for fit with eight variables that illustrate four general dimensions of 
adversarialness: initiative, directness, assertiveness, and hostility (Clayman and Heritage, 
2002; Bannerman, 2004). These variable counts were compared by term of office to 
determine whether adversarial question forms increased significantly over the two terms 
of office.  
These dependent variables were then evaluated using correlation and regression 
analysis to determine relationships, if any, to the passage of time, the presence of united 
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or divided government, and Gallup poll data measuring public presidential job approval 
and public anxiety over the possibility of an imminent terrorist attack in the US. A 
dummy variable was utilized to account for changes in adversarialness in periods of 
divided government. Divided government was defined as the situation in which the 
executive branch is controlled by one party and at least one house of Congress is 
controlled by the opposition party. Data points for all measures were recorded t  coincide 
with samples of presidential press conferences taken in the spring and fall from 2001-
2008. 
Dependent Variables 
  Eight variables act as indicators of press adversarialness and/or presidential 
deference during questioning of President Bush (Clayman and Heritage, 2002; 
Bannerman, 2004). Initiative, or the degree of energy put into question composition, is 
measured by question complexity and the inclusion of prefatory statements. More 
complex questions are considered to be less deferential as they require more energy and 
effort to answer generally. Directness, the degree of straightforwardness in a question, is 
measured by the inclusion of references to the president’s ability and/or willingness to 
provide answers to questions. Assertiveness, the degree to which questioners attempt to 
“suggest, imply or push for a particular response,” is measured by the number of 
negatively formulated questions and the presence or lack of a hostile prefatory tilt 
(Clayman and Heritage, 2002; Bannerman, 2004). Hostility, the degree to which a 
question is “overtly critical” of a president and/or administration, is measur d by the 
presence or lack of hostile prefatory statements and questions that presuppose the truth of 
the hostile prefatory statement (Clayman and Heritage, 2002; Bannerman, 2004).  
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Initiative refers to the energy evident in question composition. Questions may be 
composed simply and be answered easily with minimal personal energy expenditure 
(Clayman and Heritage, 2002). Questions may also be constructed in a more complex 
fashion, in an attempt to force an answer or limit the scope of an answer.  
  The question complexity variable describes questions in terms of composition: 
simple, prefaced, multiple questions, or super questions. Simple questions are generally 
composed of a single unit of talk and require the least energy to answer (Clayman and 
Heritage, 2002).  During the May 11, 2001 president’s news conference Jim Angle asked 
this question: “Do you believe it’s time for a more sweeping look at what is going on at 
the FBI?” Mr. Angle referenced irregularities in the FBI’s role in the Timothy McVeigh 
case and the 2001 arrest of FBI “double agent” Robert Hansson, charged with supplying 
sensitive information to agents of foreign countries. The answer may have indirectly 
challenged President Bush politically, but the composition of the question was not 
complex. Journalists may also ask more elaborate questions.  
Multiple questions from a single questioner may be more difficult to answer and 
therefore less deferential to the president. This example from the September 15, 2006 
president’s news conference illustrates multiple questions asked in a single questioning 
turn. Robert Hillman from the Dallas Morning News asked: “What do you say to the 
argument that your proposal is basically seeking support for torture, coerced evid nce, 
and secret hearings? And Senator McCain says your plan will put troops at risk. What do 
you think about that?”   
  Prefatory statements are often included to provide contextual information and to 
frame potential answers. As such, prefatory statements may be innocuous, hostile or 
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contextual. Ron Fournier of the Associated Press asked this prefaced question in the 
March 13, 2002 president’s news conference: “The Pentagon is calling for the 
development of low-yield nuclear weapons that could be used against China, Iran, Iraq, 
Libya, North Korea, Russia, and Syria. Can you explain why the United States is 
considering this new policy, and how it might figure into the war on terrorism?”  
The most complex kind of question (supercomplex) combines one or more prefatory 
statements and multiple questions in a single questioning turn. During the October 5, 
2005 president’s news conference Adam Entous asked this supercomplex question about 
the nomination of Harriet Miers to the US Supreme Court: “Some conservatives have 
said that you did not pick someone like Scalia and Thomas because you shied away from 
a battle with the Democrats. Is there any truth to that? And are you worried about charges 
of cronyism?” 
  Directness or the straightforwardness of a question is measured by the inclusion 
of references to the president’s ability and/or willingness to answer. Questions composed 
using willingness and/or ability frames are the least direct and the most deferential 
question forms. Indirect questions that ask, for example, “Are you willing to answer…” 
or “Are you able to answer…” act to lessen the imposition of a question and potentially 
facilitate more complete answers (Clayman and Heritage, 2002; Brown and Levi son, 
2004).  
  Assertiveness is the dimension of adversarialness that captures attempts o 
“suggest, imply or push for a particular response (Clayman and Heritage, 2002).” The 
assertiveness dimension is composed of negatively formulated questions and questions 
with a hostile prefatory tilt. Negatively formulated questions are those that seek some 
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politically damaging admission from the president, and/or whose initial phrasing begins 
“Aren’t you, or Don’t you…” Coding reflected the presence of a negative formulation in 
press questions. Negatively formulated questions epitomize assertiveness and may be 
treated not as though they prompt some yes or no answer, but as though they are 
“assertions and not questions (Clayman and Heritage, 2002).” This follow-up question 
from Hearst newspapers journalist Helen Thomas during the October 11, 2001 
president’s news conference illustrates the negative formulation: “Mr. President, on that 
note, we understand that you have advisers who are urging you to go after Iraq, take out
Iraq, Syria, and so forth. Do you really think that the American people will tolera e you 
widening the war beyond Afghanistan?” 
  The second example (president’s news conference on October 4, 2005) from John 
Roberts of CBS news illustrates the thematically negative formulation:  
“A couple of weeks ago you stood here in the Rose Garden with Generals Abizaid and 
Casey, and you cited the accomplishments regarding the standing up of Iraqi troops there. 
You said that there were 12 battalions that were working out of Fallujah and the western 
part, 20 in Baghdad, 100 across the nation. And then that afternoon, Abizaid and Casey 
went up to Capitol Hill and said, ‘Well, there is one battle ready battalion,’ which led 
some Republican Senators to say, ‘Well the situation is getting worse.’ So thequestion is, 
sir, it appears, between what you said and what they said, something is not adding up 
here.” The question was coded as thematically negative due to contradictory sta ements 
of President Bush and Generals Abizaid and Casey, and also referenced perceptions from 
Senators within the Republican Party that the Iraqi situation was deteriorating. 
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Questions with a hostile prefatory tilt may damage the public perception of a 
president or damage his political agenda. The preface frames a question emphasizing a 
particular interpretation and implies or suggests a preferable answer to th  question. The 
most assertive and adversarial prefatory questions are those most damaging to the 
interests, character, and/or policy agenda of a president (Clayman and Heritage, 2002; 
Pomerantz, 1988). Some prefatory statements are relatively innocuous. The prefac
implies a preferred answer, but the answer and preface are not damaging to the political 
interests of the president. Questions were coded as having no tilt (prefatory st ements 
that contextualize a question without suggesting a preferred response), an innocuous tilt, 
or a hostile tilt. The following prefatory statement from the president’s July 15, 2008 
news conference was coded as having no tilt: “Following up on the question about oil, in 
the past, when oil prices have gone up a lot, they’ve wound up going down a lot 
afterward. But I wonder if you’re able to say that oil prices in the future are going to 
come down a lot?”  
  Prefatory statements with an innocuous tilt imply a preferred answer, but the 
answer and preface are not damaging to the political interests of the president (Clayman 
and Heritage, 2002). Washington Times journalist Bill Sammon asked the following 
question during the president’s March 16, 2005 news conference. The prefatory statement 
was coded as having an innocuous tilt: “Mr. President, you faced a lot of skepticism in 
the run-up to the Iraq war and then a lot of criticism for miscalculating some of th
challenges of postwar Iraq. Now that the Iraq elections seem to be triggering signs of 
democratization throughout the broader Middle East, do you feel any sense of 
vindication?” 
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  A hostile prefatory tilt is detrimental to the public perception of a president and 
damaging to his political agenda. The preface frames a question emphasizing a particular 
interpretation and implies or suggests a preferable answer to the question. The following 
prefatory statement from Cox News journalist Ken Herman during the president’  March 
16, 2005 news conference was coded as having a hostile tilt:  
“Mr. President, earlier this year you told us you wanted your administration to cease and 
desist on payments to journalists to promote your agenda. You cited the need for ethical 
concerns and the need for a bright line between the press and the Government. Your 
administration continues to make use of video news releases, which is prepackaged news 
stories sent to television stations, fully aware that some or many of these sations will air 
them without any disclaimer that they are produced by the Government. The Comptroller 
General of the United States this week said that raises ethical questions. Does it rais  
ethical questions about the use of Government money to produce stories about the 
Government that wind up being aired with no disclosure that they were produced by the 
Government?” 
  Hostility, the degree to which a question is “overtly critical” of a president and/or 
administration, is measured by the presence or lack of hostile prefatory statements and 
questions that presuppose the truth of the hostile prefatory statement. The coding for 
variables on the hostility dimension assessed thematic content of the question. Questions 
with a hostile preface, one which is overtly critical of president, policy, or administration, 
were coded as containing a hostile preface (Clayman and Heritage, 2002; Bannerman, 
2004). The following prefatory statement from the president’s September 15, 2006 news 
conference was coded as having a hostile preface: “Thank you Mr. President. On a other 
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of your top priorities, immigration, leaders of both parties have indicated that any ch ce 
of comprehensive immigration reform is dead before the election. Is this an issue you 
would like to revisit in a lame-duck session after the election? Or would it be put off until 
the new Congress?” This question was coded as hostile as it must have been somewhat 
embarrassing for the president to answer. The preface correctly identified comprehensive 
immigration reform as a top priority of the president’s domestic policy agenda in 2005-
2006. The preface also correctly identified the president’s inability to persuade members 
of Congress, that bipartisan reluctance to further activate negative public opinion on the 
issue had stalled any possibility of Bush’s desired immigration reforms before the 2006 
elections. But the questions asked did not build upon the hostile preface. Instead the 
questions addressed tactical concerns about timing and reintroduction of the immigration 
issue to Congress and the public. 
  Questions with a hostile preface presupposed to be true build on the hostile 
preface to lessen the impact and credibility of refutation (Clayman and Heritage, 2002; 
Bannerman, 2004). The following question from Knight Ridder journalist Ron Hutcheson 
during the president’s September 15, 2006 news conference was coded as having a 
hostile tilt presupposed to be true: “On both the eavesdropping program and the detainee 
issues you’re working with Congress sort of after the fact, after you established these 
programs on your own authority. And Federal courts have ruled in both cases, you 
overstepped your authority. Is your willingness to work with Congress now an 
acknowledgement that that is a fact?” The hostile tilt and factual supposition of the 
preface extends an inference that Bush had failed to understand the Constitutional limits 
of his authority as President (See Table 1).  
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  Factor analysis was performed to determine whether the dependent variables are 
influenced by common underlying factors. The optimal number was determined 
according to the Kaiser criterion and scree test (DeCoster, 1998). Factor analysis of the 
dependent variables showed three such components. To facilitate interpretation, factors 
were rotated using orthogonal varimax rotation. Varimax rotation produced a rotated 
factor matrix with correlation scores between each variable and underlying factor 
(DeCoster, 1998). The three factors were defined by theoretical constructs potentially 
responsible for the pattern of positive and negative loadings (DeCoster, 1998). The 
factors conform to three of the four general dimensions of adversarialness defined by 
Clayman and Heritage (2002): hostility, accommodation and press initiative. Reliability 
tests were performed to insure that dependent variables measure press adversari lness. A 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .800 was obtained for dependent variables.  
It should be noted that several variables are subsets of other dependent variables. 
For example, five variables measure the presence and/or content of prefatory statements. 
Two of these, the preface and super variables measure the inclusion of prefatory 
statements in all questioning turns. The total number of prefatory statements will be 
reflected in the combined scores of the variables preface (measures presence of 
preliminary statements preceding a single question) and super (measures super-complex 
questions with prefatory statements and multiple questions). Prefatory statements are 
further divided to reflect the tilt of questions. Question prefaces may be tilted to suggest 
some preferred answer or not. The variable notilt indicates the presence of prefat ry 
statements that are merely contextual. The variable innoc indicates the presence of 
prefatory statements that are not damaging to the president and may help the presid nt’s 
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agenda. The variable hostile indicates the number of prefatory statements that are
potentially damaging to the political interests of the president.  
The three variables notilt, innoc, and hostile equal the total number of prefatory 
statements indicated by the dependent variables preface and super (85 prefaced questions 
during the first term, and 117 total prefaced questions during the second term). Hostile 
prefatory statements are further divided with the hospref and hppresup variables. The 
hospref variable indicates the presence of overtly critical prefatory statements, and the 
hppresup variable indicates that the questioner assumes the hostile preface is factual and 
accurate. As such, the variables measuring the hostility dimension of adversarialne s are 
subsets of larger variables and represent the most adversarial exchanges betwe n 
journalist and president. 
[Table 1 About Here] 
Independent Variables 
The creation of foreign policy news is affected by much more than ranking the 
impact and importance of relevant events as they occur. The rally effects of 9/11, a 
Republican president and US journalists and corporate press elites eager to avoid ch rges 
of ‘liberal bias’ led to overly deferential coverage of the executive branch ad the ‘war on 
terror.’ A model accounting for power relations among the US news media, public, and 
decision makers during this kind of crisis event is lacking (Bennett, 1990; Bannerman, 
2004). This study examines the impact of public deference to the president upon the 
adversarial nature of US press corps questioning of the president during presidential pr ss 
conferences (See Table 2).   
[Table 2 About Here] 
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Presidential Job Approval 
  It is assumed that press deference to the president will decrease as George W. 
Bush’s public job approval decreases. American voters provide favorable or unfavorable 
appraisals of presidents based partly on their perceptions of job success (Neustadt, 1980; 
Mueller, 1970). These approval assessments can motivate, as well as constrain 
presidential action (Mueller, 1970; Brace and Hinckley, 1992). These public assessments 
have been likened to political currency that the president may use to influence the public 
and others within government (Neustadt, 1980; Edwards, 1989). The presidential 
approval data were drawn from the Gallup organization’s monthly average presidential 
job approval ratings for president George W. Bush. For decades the Gallup organization 
has asked the question: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way [the incumbent] is 
handling his job as president?” Data points represent the percentage of respondents who 
answered the question negatively.     
Public Anxiety 
  It is assumed that press deference to president George W. Bush will decrease as 
public anxiety over terrorism increases. Individuals whose most prominent reaction to 
terrorism is anxiety often support cautious foreign policies (Huddy et al, 2005). Anxiety 
increases feelings associated with risk aversion and prompts an affective state consistent 
with less support of military action and other aggressive internationalist foreign policy 
goals (Marcus and MacKuen, 1993; Huddy et al, 2005). Individual perceptions of anxiety 
are more often accompanied by isolationist and accommodative preferences, whil 
individual perceptions of threat tend towards assertive internationalist policies (Holsti, 
2004; Herman, Tetlock, and Visser, 1999). Individual expressions of anxiety due to 
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terrorist actions and future terrorist threats are consistent with foreign policy preferences 
of risk aversion and isolation from threatening entities (Huddy et al, 2005; Long, 1990).  
  The public anxiety data were drawn from Gallup organization polling data. The 
Gallup organization asks the question: “How worried are you that you or someone in 
your family will become a victim of terrorism—very worried, somewhat worried, not too 
worried, or not worried at all? The anxiety responses in the “very worried” and “not too 
worried” categories were combined to give an average rating of public anxiety over 
potential terrorism during each year of the Bush administration. The variable w s recoded 
so that higher numbers indicate increasing public cynicism towards the executive branch 









This thesis examines the composition of US press questioning of the president 
during presidential press conferences to determine whether increases in adversarial 
questioning during the Bush administration were related to public terrorism anxiety. After 
the 9/11 attacks many Americans were profoundly affected by the event. Perceptions of 
threat to national stability and anxiety over the possibility of future terrorist attacks were 
two common emotional responses to the event. When coupled with perceptions of mortal 
terror, these responses primed different reactions among the public and American press 
(Huddy et al, 2005; Willer, 2004). Several theoretical expectations follow from the 
reviewed literature.  
The first hypothesis addresses the question of whether the Bush administration 
experienced increasingly adversarial relations between the White HousePress Corps and 
the president over time. Recent scholarship suggests that over time the White House 
Press Corps has become more adversarial and less deferential as measured by q estion 
composition (Clayman and Heritage, 2002; Bannerman, 2004).
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This assertion is wholly consistent with theories of presidential approval that caim the 
passage of time is an important explanatory variable for presidential support in general 
and press deference in particular (Mueller, 1970; Brace and Hinckley, 1992; Clayman 
and Heritage, 2002). The change has also been attributed to factors ranging from 
strategy-over substance campaign coverage to a focus on scandals in Congress (Roz ll, 
1994; Sabato, 1991; Patterson, 1993; Clayman and Heritage, 2002).  
H 1: Adversarial questioning of the president will increase throughout the term of office 
in accordance with theories linking the decay of presidential approval to the passage of 
time. This hypothesis is supported by the data collected.  
Adversarial questioning of President Bush did increase during his second term of 
office. Question complexity increased for three of four variables measuring journalistic 
initiative (x2 = 10.2; p=.038).  Data collected show that adversarial questioning during the 
Bush administration increased for nine of the variables used to measure adversarial press 
questioning of George W. Bush.  
Initiative, or the degree of energy put into question composition, is measured by 
question complexity and the inclusion of prefatory statements (See Table 3). More 
complex questions are considered to be less deferential as they require more energy and 
effort to answer generally (Clayman and Heritage, 2002).  
[Table 3 About Here] 
Journalists became less inclined to compose questions simply during the term of George
W. Bush. Simple question composition allows the president the maximum degree of 
flexibility in providing an answer. This was expected for three reasons. The data reflect a 
general trend towards more negative press coverage of political affairsnd more hostile 
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coverage of Congress (Rozell, 1994; Robinson, 1981; Clayman and Heritage, 2002; 
Bannerman, 2004). Mediated news presentations have become more subjective and 
interpretive, often featuring aspects of coverage perceived to be biased in some way 
(Capella and Jamieson, 1997; Patterson, 1993; Clayman and Heritage, 2002). 
Interactional norms regarding encounters between the press and the president, as w ll as 
other high level government officials, have likely changed over time as well. Clayman 
and Heritage (2002) found substantially less deferential treatment of the president by the 
press from 1953-1988. The press during the Bush administration followed this trend as 
question formulations became more adversarial in nature during the second term of 
office. 
 The directness of questions as measured by journalist use of referencing frames
during presidential press conferences indicates an increase in adversarial formulations 
during the Bush administration. Directness, the degree of straightforwardness in a 
question, is measured by the inclusion of references to the president’s ability and/or
willingness to provide answers to questions. Questions composed using willingness 
and/or ability frames are the least direct and the most deferential question forms. Indirect 
questions lessen the imposition of a question and potentially facilitate more complete 
answers and are perceived as more polite (Clayman and Heritage, 2002; Brown and 
Levinson, 1989).  
The data support the assessment that journalists were less polite and deferential in 
terms of the employment of indirect question frames during the second term of the Bush 
administration. Both variables measuring the dimension of adversarialness termed
directness show that this type of referencing frame decreased considerably (43% and 77% 
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for the ability and willingness frames respectively). The data show that fewer questions 
were framed in this manner and the Chi-square statistic surpasses the upper boundary of 
the .05 threshold (x2 = 10.4; p=.016). This suggests that journalists were less disposed 
towards posing deferential questions, especially the most deferential form, willingness 
framed questions. Willingness frames are more deferential than ability frames because 
they give the president a greater discretion in providing an answer. Non-answers or non-
responsive answers in reply to ability-framed questions may be considered acceptable 
due to a lack of knowledge or when an answer might imperil national security (Clayman 
and Heritage, 2002). A refusal to answer questions framed in terms of willingness may be 
due to these considerations, but may also reflect a simple personal unwillingness to 
provide the requested information. This deferential question form decreased by 77% in 
the second Bush term (See Table 4). 
[Table 4 About Here] 
Assertiveness is the dimension of adversarialness that captures attempts to 
“suggest, imply or push for a particular response (Clayman and Heritage, 2002).” The 
assertiveness dimension is composed of negatively formulated questions and questions 
with a hostile prefatory tilt. Negatively formulated questions are those that seek some 
politically damaging admission for the answerer (See Table 6). Negatively formulated 
questions epitomize assertiveness and may be treated not as though they prompt some yes 
or no answer, but as though they are “assertions and not questions (Clayman and 
Heritage, 2002).” Journalist use of this question form increased over time during the 
Bush administration, but the increase was not significant. 
[Table 5 About Here] 
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[Table 6 About Here] 
Assertive questioning of President Bush increased during his second term of 
office. Assertiveness increased for two of three relevant variables. Assertiven ss is 
measured by four variables. The first measures the presence or absence of a prefatory tilt 
in question composition (See Table 5). Questions posed without prefatory tilt increased 
24.5% during the second Bush term. In spite of this, it appears that assertively composed 
questions increased. Questions with hostile prefatory tilt indicate contradictory statements 
among executive branch spokesmen and/or perceptions from Congress, the president’s 
party and the public that some issue that the president has an ability or duty to address is 
worsening. Questions with a hostile prefatory tilt may damage the public perception of a 
president or damage his political agenda. The preface frames a question emphasizing 
some interpretation and implies some answer to the question. The most assertive and 
adversarial prefatory questions are those most damaging to the interests, character, and/or 
policy agenda of a president (Clayman and Heritage, 2002; Pomerantz, 1988). The hostile 
prefatory tilt formulation increased by more than 20% in the second Bush term of office.
Questions with an innocuous prefatory tilt may suggest some answer, but answer ad 
preface are not damaging to the political interests of the president. The use of 
innocuously tilted question formulations fell by 50% during the second Bush term of 
office.   
[Table 7 About Here] 
Hostility is the final dimension of adversarialness. Hostility, defined here as the 
degree to which a question is “overtly critical” of a president and/or administration, is 
measured by the presence or lack of hostile prefatory statements and questions tha  
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presuppose the truth of the hostile prefatory statement. Variables assessing the hostility 
dimension evaluated thematic content questions. Those with a hostile preface which were 
overtly critical of president, policy, or administration, and requested a response to the 
hostile formulation specifically, were coded as containing a hostile preface (Clayman and 
Heritage, 2002; Bannerman, 2004). The data collected measuring the hostility dimension 
do not permit a rejection of the null hypothesis (x2 = 5.56; C.V. = 5.991; p=.0620). 
Questions with hostile prefaces and hostile prefaces presupposed to be true reduced in the 
second term of the Bush administration (4.9% and 5.1% respectively). The variables 
assessed thematic content and not simply the composition of the question posed. To avoid 
subjective assessments, the variables hospref (hostile preface) and hppresup (hostile 
preface presupposed to be true by the questioner) were coded conservatively. Only those 
questions which clearly and overtly implied that criticisms of president, policy, r 
administration were factual were coded as indicating this type of hostile preface and/or 
presupposition that some assertion was correct.   
It is assumed that press deference to the president will decrease as job approval 
ratings decrease. American voters supply appraisals of presidents based partly upon 
perceptions of presidential job performance (Neustadt, 1980; Mueller, 1970). These 
approval assessments can alter the relative persuasive ability of presidents and may 
modify press/president encounters also (Mueller, 1970; Brace and Hinckley, 1992). The 
reviewed literature suggests a relationship between executive job approval and the
composition of less deferential question by the press. 
H 2: Press deference will decrease/increase as presidential job approval ratings fall/rise. 
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The second hypothesis is partially supported. Seven of thirteen relationships 
produced moderately strong to strong Pearson correlation coefficients, though only four 
of the obtained coefficients were statistically significant at the .05 level. Of the four 
variables measuring the initiative dimension, two relationships support the hypothesis 
that press deference will decrease/increase as presidential job approval ratings fall/rise. 
The variables simp and super measure the degree to which questions attempt to constrain 
the answerer and appear to reflect the overall trend towards a less deferential p ss over 
time (Clayman and Heritage, 2002). The substantive relationship between approval and 
the super variable is noteworthy. Super measures the presence of supercomplex 
questions, those containing preliminary statements and multiple questions. Supercomplx 
questions of this type are considered to be the least deferential form as they are the most 
elaborate. Initial bivariate regression analysis of the super and presidential approval 
variables produced a regression coefficient of .094 and Adjusted R-square .524. Based on 
this sample, supercomplex questions increase .094 for each single point increase in 
executive approval. The null hypothesis for the variable super may be rejected. The 
regression coefficient has a t-ratio of 4.185 and p-value of .001. The presence of divided 
government appears to have minimal effect on the variable super, though when the 
Congress and Executive branch were divided, the multi variable increased an average of 
three points with results significant at the .05 level. The strength and direction for preface 
and multi, the other 2 variables measuring initiative, suggest that as presidential approval 
decreases/increases, the incidents of less deferential question forms will decrease/increase 
also. Either outcome would contradict predictions from reviewed literature on press-
president-public relations.  
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The innoc variable measures prefaced questions that imply a preferred answer, but 
answer and preface are not damaging to the political interests of the president. The innoc 
variable produced the largest Pearson correlation coefficient, -.714 which is statistically 
significant at the .001 level. Bivariate regression analysis of the innoc and presi ential 
approval variables produced a regression coefficient of -.128 and Adjusted R-square .475. 
This provides some substantive support for the hypothesis that press deference will 
decrease as presidential job approval ratings fall. Based on this sample, innocuously 
prefaced questions decrease .128 for each single point increase in executive appro al. 
The regression coefficient has a t-ratio of -3.82 and p-value of .002.  
The data partially support the null hypothesis. Nearly half of Pearson correlati n 
coefficients (six of thirteen) obtained for IV/DV relationships are moderate or very weak 
suggesting that the relationship between executive job approval and the variables 
measuring aspects of press question composition do not move together in systematic 
fashion. Overall, nine of thirteen variables support the hypothesis that no systematic 
relationship exists between the variables measuring the deference of question 
composition and presidential approval over time. It is the case that questioning forms o  
the press became less deferential from one term of office to another during the Bush 
administration. It is also true that the job approval ratings of President Bush followed a 
familiar cycle wherein approval at the beginning of the administration was higher than 
when it ended eight years later, but the assertiveness and hostility dimensions of press 
adversarialness rise and fall independently of job approval ratings. 
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The reviewed literature on public perceptions of anxiety over terrorism suggests a 
relationship between public terrorism anxiety and the composition of less deferential 
questions by the press. 
H 3: Press deference to the president will decrease/rise as public terrorism anxiety 
increases/falls. 
The data partially supports hypothesis three. Thirteen variables measure press deference. 
Six show a moderate to moderately strong relationship with the anxiety variable. Nine of 
thirteen variables have the positive and negative directions predicted, but the strength of 
the relationships is weak. It is clear that some relationship exists between dimensions of 
press deference to the president and public terrorism anxiety. Correlation analysis 
supports the hypothesis that press deference to the president will decrease/increase as 
public terrorism anxiety increases/decreases (See Table 8).  
The direction of eleven of thirteen variables suggests that deference to the president does 
decrease/increase as public terrorism anxiety increases/decreases. The data show that 
dimensions of adversarialness capturing press assertiveness and hostility have he 
hypothesized relationship in which these aspects of adversarial questioning will 
increase/fall as public terrorism anxiety increases/falls. Two variables (hostile and neg) 
showed significant correlations at the .005 level, both measuring the assertiveness 
dimension of adversarialness. Assertiveness, measured in terms of negative question 
formulations and overtly critical prefaces, did increase as public anxiety ovr terrorism 
increased. Initial bivariate regression analysis shows that public terrorism anxiety, 
negative formulations, and questions with a hostile preface are related. Base on this 
sample there is a .169 increase in hostile and a .199 increase in neg for each one point 
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increase in anxiety over terrorism. The independent variables work together in t 
manner anticipated. Approval has bearing on whether question formulations are 
more/less adversarial in terms of question composition and aspects of assertiveness. 
Anxiety influences the degree to which questions are hostile and negatively formulated, 
affecting the assertiveness and hostility dimensions of adversarial question design.  For 
example, the regression coefficient for anxiety and hospref, the dependent variable will 
increase .143 for each single unit increase in the independent variable anxiety.  
 Multiple regression analysis was used to measure the effects of a single 
independent variable upon a dependent variable while controlling for other independent 
variable effects (Pollack, 2005). Multiple regression analysis revealed notable 
relationships between independent and dependent variables. Time, job approval, and 
public anxiety over terrorism hold predictive power over the initiative, assertiveness, and 
hostility dimensions of press adversarialness (See Table 9). Model adjusted R quare 
values ranged between .254 and .401 suggesting that the three independent variables 
provide substantial explanatory power for differences in adversarial question 
composition, though roughly 60-70 % of variation remains unexplained by these models. 
Nine additional variables showed interesting, but less robust correlations with the anxiety 
variable. It appears that public anxiety regarding some imminent terrorist threat was 
related to the type of questions asked of George W. Bush. Along the initiative dimension, 
moderate correlations between the anxiety variable and two of four variables suggest that 
as anxiety over terrorism increases the press will behave more deferentially i  terms of 







This thesis examined press questioning of the president during presidential press 
conferences to determine whether increases in adversarial questioning during the Bush 
administration were related to public terrorism anxiety and job approval. Assessing the 
balance of power between the US press and the president during foreign policy crises is a 
complicated task. It is clear that questioning during the Bush administration became more 
adversarial in terms of more elaborate question composition and decreasing press 
deference to the president. Power relations between press and president are in flux 
generally and remain so in times of crisis, but increasing anxiety and falli g presidential 
approval are related to increases in adversarialness across all dimensions of que tion 
composition analyzed in this thesis. Assertiveness, measured in terms of negative 
question formulations and overtly critical prefaces, increased significantly as public 
anxiety over terrorism increased. During the Bush administration some advers rial 
questioning forms were certainly related to the level of anxiety present within the public.          
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Public expectations regarding press behavior hold that the press should be independent of 
outside influence and able to objectively criticize government officials to facilitate 
government accountability to the public. It is also true that the US government routiely 
use the news media to inform and lead public action in crisis situations through direct and 
mediated presentations of information supplied by the government to the media (Graber, 
2006). Journalists must balance skepticism of government officials with the fac that 
continued access to governmental sources of information must be maintained. For 
journalists covering the White House, achieving this balance may be more important as 
continued access to decision-makers is of primary importance. Aspects of White Hous  
Press Corps questioning of George W. Bush were, at times, unconstrained by executiv  
popularity and public anxiety over terrorism. Some of the most adversarial questions 
were posed in the months after 9/11 when a high degree of deference might be expected.  
One limit of this research is the applicability of data collected for the anxi ty 
variable. The data captured aggregate anxiety scores of persons polled by the Gallup 
organization. A survey dedicated to capturing the anxiety scores of some group of 
journalists may have resulted in different levels of anxiety. The general public and 
journalists are likely different in terms of information processing ability and the relative 
importance to place on some specific aspect of a crisis (Entman and Page, 1994; Zaller, 
1992; Zaller, 1994). Other research suggests the differences between public and press 
may be less sweeping, as both members of the press and public often rally around the flag 
in response to some crisis (Zaller and Chiu, 2001).  
House effects of organizations may affect individual journalist’s question 
composition (Smith, 1978). House effects refer to differences in standard procedure, 
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culture, and organization that may influence the output of polling organizations (Smith, 
1978). House effects may also influence the behavior of individuals within news media 
organizations. While beyond the scope of this thesis, determining the effect of specific 
factors related to inter-house differences in organizational culture, political culture, and 
standard operating procedures of news media organizations would likely shed further 
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Table 1. Dependent Variable Descriptive Statistics. 
Dependent 
Variables 
Mean  Median Mode Std. Deviation 
simp 6.3 6 6 3.4199 
preface 7.4 7 7 3.1384 
multi 2.8 2.5  2.4630 
super 5.9 6.5 7 2.1437 
ability 2.3 2 2 1.25 
willing .9375 0 0 1.34 
preftilt 9.1 9 9 4.4403 
notilt 5.4 5 3 2.5528 
innoc 4.3 4.5 5 3.0489 
hostile 4.9 5.5 2 2.4891 
neg 8 8 9 2.9665 
hospref 5 5.5 3 2.3944 

















Table 2. Independent Variable Descriptive Statistics. 
Independent 
Variables 
Mean Median Mode Std. Deviation 
job approval 49.6 53.5 63 16.9622 






















Table 3. Question Complexity by Term- George W. Bush 
 Simple Prefaced Multi Super Total 
Term 1- n 61 45 28 40 174 
              % 35 26 16 23 100 
Term 2- n 49 62 15 55 181 
              % 27 34 8 30 100 









































Table 4. Other Referencing Question Frames by Term- George W. Bush 
 None Ability Willing Total 
Term 1- n 135 21 13 169 
              % 80 12 8 100 
Term 2- n 166 16 3 184 
              % 90 9 1 100 









































Table 5. Yes-No Questions with Preface Tilt by Term- George W. Bush 
 No Tilt  Innocuous Hostile Total 
Term 1- n 4 46 35 85 
              % 5 54 41 100 
Term 2- n 50 23 44 117 
              % 42 20 38 100 









































Table 6. Negatively Formulated Questions by Term- George W. Bush 
 Not Negative Negative Total 
Term 1- n 116 53 169 
              % 69 31 100 
Term 2- n 110 75 185 
              % 59 41 100 









































Table 7. Preface Hostility by Term- George W. Bush 
 Non-Hostile 
Preface 




Term 1- n 44 41 17 102 
              % 43 40 17 100 
Term 2- n 78 39 16 133 
              % 59 29 12 100 

























Table 8. Correlations- Pearson’s r 
 Public Anxiety Exec Job Approval 
Initiative- simp  .333 -.409 
Initiative- preface  .018 -.204 
Initiative- multi  .050 -.569* 
Initiative- super -.391 .745* 
Directness- ability -.030 -.309 
Directness- willing -.045 -.564* 
Assertiveness-
preftilt 
 .402 -.460 
Assertiveness- notilt  .133 -.041 
Assertiveness- innoc  .130 -.714** 
Assertiveness-
hostile 
 .531*  .029 
Assertiveness- neg  .523*  .126 
Hostility- hospref  .467 -.258 
Hostility- hppresup  .179  .007 
** Correlation significant at 0.001 level (2-tailed). 















Table 9. Group Independent Variables/ Dependent Variable Multiple Regression 
Independent 
Variables 
     Unstandardized  Coefficients Sig. 
 B Std. Error  
(Constant) 13.263 4.264 .009 
approval -.229 .072 .008 
anxiety -.097 .076 .229 
time .577 .259 .046 
Dependent Variable: multi; Adjusted R Square= .401. 
 
 B Std. Error  
(Constant) -9.671 4.344 .046 
approval .170 .073 .039 
anxiety .273 .078 .858 
time -.622 .264 .037 
Dependent Variable: hostile; Adjusted R Square= .392. 
 
 B Std. Error  
(Constant) -4.492 7.773 .574 
approval .134 .131 .327 
anxiety .362 .139 .023 
time -.966 .473 .064 
Dependent Variable: preftilt; Adjusted R Square= .388. 
 
 B Std. Error  
(Constant) -4.409 4.626 .359 
approval .090 .078 .271 
anxiety .214 .083 .024 
time -.474 .281 .118 
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Figure 1. Causality in Relationships among Mass Media, Events, Public 
Opinion and Decision-makers (Baum Potter, 2008). 
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APPENDIX 1: Press Question Code Sheet (Bannerman, 2004) 
 
1. Press Briefing Date _____  
2. Total number of questions ______ 
3. Total number of questioning turns ______ 
A. Initiative Dimension/Question Composition  
A1. Simple ______ 
A2. Prefaced ______  
A3. Multiple ______  
A4. Supercomplex _____ 
B. Directness Dimension/Ability and Willingness Question Frames 
B1. Ability ______ 
B2. Willing ______  
C. Assertiveness Dimension. 
C1. Preface Tilt ______  
C2. Innocuous ______  
C3. Hostile ______  
C4. No Tilt ______  
C5. Negatively Formulated Questions ______  
D. Hostility Dimension 
D1. Preface Hostility _____  














APPENDIX 2: Code Sheet Instructions (Bannerman, 2004) 
 
1. Press Briefing Date: Month, day, and year of press briefing. 
2. Total number of questions: All questions posed by journalists to the president during 
the press briefing. 
3. Total number of questioning turns: A questioning turn occurs when the president 
responds to one reporter’s question or series of questions. 
 
The question design features are scored by the total number of features present in each  
presidential press conference. 
A. Initiative Dimension/Question Composition: Measures the elaborateness of question 
composition. 
A1. Simple: One sentence question. 
A2. Prefaced: Elaborated preliminary statement to a single question. 
A3. Multiple: More than one question. 
A4. Supercomplex: Both prefaced statements and multiple questions. 
B. Directness Dimension/Ability and Willingness Question Frames: Question 
construction indicates the president may decline to answer based upon ability or 
willingness to provide a response. 
B1. Ability: Can/could you + comment, explain, or tell? 
B2. Willingness: Will/would you + comment, explain, or tell? 
C. Assertiveness Dimension: Measures the presence of questioner attempts to suggest 
some preferred answer within a questioning turn. 
 
C1. Preface Tilt: Yes-no question involving a prefatory statement tilted towards a 
preferred answer. 
C2. Innocuous tilt: Non-damaging prefatory tilt, which may favor presidential agendas. 
C3. Hostile tilt: Potentially politically damaging prefatory tilt against the presid nt. 
C4. No tilt: Neutral prefatory statement that identifies or contextualizes some question. 
C5. Negatively Formulated Question: Questions that push for a particular answer. 
Questions of this type often begin with phrases like isn’t it, aren’t you, or don’t you think 
that… 
D. Hostility Dimension: Indicates the degree to which a question is overtly critical of a 
president and/or administration. Hostility is measured by the presence or lack ofhostile 
prefatory statements and questions that presuppose the truth of the hostile prefatory 
statement. 
D1. Preface Hostility: Overly critical remarks of the president and/or administration in 
question prefaces. 
D2. Preface Presupposed as True by Question: Question invites president to respond to 
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